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[8. F. No. 18345. In Bank. Dee. 11, 1953.} 
THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. BUILDING MAINTENANCE 
CONTRACTORS' ASSOCIATION, INC., et aI., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Monopolies-Oartwright Act-Agreements and Oombinations 
Prohibited.-Agreement between Bome building maintenance 
contractors of city whereunder they not only agree to fix 
prices at which maintenance service will be provided, but also 
undertake to prevent competition among themselves by forcing 
their customers to pay higher prices if they seek to change 
maintenance contractors, constitptes a trust as defined by 
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720, relating to combinations in re-
straint of trade. 
[2] Id.-Cartwr!ght Act-Validity.-Provisions of Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 16723, exempting from operation of Cartwright A.ct 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16700 et seq.) any agreement, combina-
tion or association, the object and pnrpose of which are to 
conduct operations at a "reasonable profit" or to market at a 
"reasonable profit" those products which cannot otherwise be 
80 marketed, are too vague and infect the whole statutory 
standard of conduct, since there is no common-law background 
or fund of common knowledge or experience that would allow 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Monopolies and Combinations, § 9 et seq.; Am. 
Jur., Monopolies, Combinations and Restraints of Trade, § 16 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6] Monopolies, § 6; [2, 4, 5] Monopo-
lies, § 5; [8J Statutes, § 76; [7J Monopolies. § 12: [8J Monopolies, 
§2 . 
• .A hearing was cranted b7 the Supretll.e Coun OD Dec. 18. 1952. 
) 
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either the members of such an association or a court to de-
termine what the quoted words mean. 
[S] Statutes-Amendment-Validity.-An invalid amendment to 
a valid statute is ineffective for any purpoei!. 
[4] MonopoUes-OartwrightAct-Validity.-lf the state could 
not attack an amendment to the Cartwright Act exempting 
from its operation any agreement, combination or association, 
the object and purpose of which are to conduct operations 
at a "reasonable pr';)fit." etc. (Bus. 4; Prof. Code, § 16723), on 
the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague, it would re-
main part of statutory standard of conduct and resulting un-
certainty would necessitate invalidating entire statute, and 
since the amendment is separable from rest of statute it must 
be treated as invalid f",r all purposes. 
[5] ld.-Oartwright Act-Validity.-Agreements fixing prices are 
invalid both at common law and under provisions of the Cart-
wright Act, and an agreement between some building mainte-
nance contractors of city whereunder they agreed to fix prices 
.at which maintenance service will be provided and undertake 
to prevent competition among themselves by forcing their 
customers to pay higher prices if they seek to change mainte-
nance contractors is not exempt from opel'ation of such statute 
by the provision of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16725, that "It is not 
unlawful to enter into agreements or form associations or com-
binations . . . which are in furtherance of trade." 
(6] Id. - Oartwright Act - Agreements and Combinations Pro-
hibited.-Ordinarily a person soliciting bids for maintenance 
service would do so in advance of 6Xpiration date of his 
. current contract, not for purpose of breaching his contract 
but to avoid interruption of service in event that he should 
not wish to renew it. and hence in the usual situation an 
agreement between some building maintenance contractors of 
city whereunder they agree to fix prices at which maintenance 
service will be provided and undertake to prevent competition 
among themselves by forcing their customers to pay higher 
prices if they seek to change maintenance contractors does n01 
operate to prevent interference with existing contract rights. 
[7a,7b] Id. - Oartwright Act - Injunctive BeUef.-A judgment 
enjoining certain building maintenance contractors of city 
from ''Formulating, promoting, participating or combining in 
any understanding, compact, plan or agreement to raise, h, 
adhere to or maintain prices for the furnishing of labor, 
material and services in the building maintenance industry" 
cannot reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting such con-
[3] Previous statute as affected by attempted but unconstitu-
tional amendment, note, 76 A.L.R. 1483. See, also, Oal.,Jur .. 
Statutes, § 74; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 4eB et seq. 
\ 
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tractors from contracting with their customers to provide 
services at &nch prices as customers may agree to pay, but 
only enjoins contractors from agreeing among themselves to 
engage in probibitedactivities. 
[8] Id.-Pa.rticular Agreements and Oomblnations.-A price ftxing 
agreement is not one whereby one party merely agrees to 
supply goods or services to another at a given price, but one 
whereby the parties seek to determine price at which goods 
or services shall be offered to third parties. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco granting a new trial. 
Sylvain J. Lazarus, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to enjoin alleged violations of Cartwright Act (Bus. 
& Prof. Code, §§ 16700-16758). Order granting defendants 
a new trial following a judgment for plaintiff, reversed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn. 
'AssIstant Attorney General, B. Abbott Goldberg, Deputy 
Attorney General, Thomas C. Lynch, District Attorney (San 
Francisco), and Gregory Stout, Deputy District Attorney, 
for Appellant. 
Landels & Weigel, Francis McCarty and Stanley A. Weigel 
for Respondents. 
TRA YNOR, J .-Plaintiff appeals from an order granting 
a new trial after judgment was -entered against defendants 
in an action brought to enjoin alleged violations of the Cart-
wright Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§16700-16758.) 
The facts are stipulated. Defendants are the Building 
Maintenance Contractors' Association, an unincurporated 
association, and its members, who are all building maintenance 
contractors in San Francisco. The building maintenance in. 
dustry is defined as "all persons, associations, firms, partner-
ships and/or corporations participating in the maintenance 
operation (as distinguished from ownership, leasing or man-
aging), cleaning. painting. renovating and supplying of 
janitorial service for buildings, lofts and stores in San Fran-
cisco. " Maintenance contractors are defined as .. persons, 
firms, partnerships and/or corporations engaged, in the build· 
ing maintenance industry in San Francisco, in the business of 
contracting, for a fixed term, with owners, lessees or managers 
of buildings, lofts or stores located in San Francisco to dc. 
/ 
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for designated buildings, lofts or stores so located, part or 
all of anyone or more of the following: Window cleaning, 
janitor work, providing of elevator operators and starters, 
providing of building engineers for maintaining heating 
equipment and for minor repairs, providing of night watch-
men and providing of powder room matrons." There are 
44 maintenance contractors in San Francisco of whom 30 are 
not members of defendant association. Members of the asso-
ciation, however, employ approximately 90 per cent of the 
total number of employees employed by all maintenance con-
tractors in San Francisco and service approximately 90 per 
cent of all San Francisco buildings, lofts, and stores serviced 
by maintenance contractors. Maintenance contractors employ 
approximately 25 per cent of the employees supplied by 
various unions for building maintenance, and the remainder 
of the organized employees are supplied directly to owners, 
lessees, and managers. The terms and conditions of employ-
ment of the organized workers are the same whether they 
are employed by maintenance contractors or directly by 
owners, lessees, or managers. All of defendant maintenance 
contractors service less than one-half of one per cent of the 
buildings, lofts, and stores in San Francisco. 
Defendants have agreed that if bids are called for by 
any person having an existing, unexpired contract with any 
member of their association, the members whose bids are 
solicited will report that fact to the association. The asso-
ciation then makes an investigation to determine whether the 
price under the existing contract is reasonable, whether the 
service is satisfactory, and whether the person soliciting bids 
has any specific reason, no matter how trivial or personal, 
for dispensing with the services of the current contractor. 
If the price is found to be reasonable, the service satisfactory, 
and there is no specific reason for changing maintenance con-
tractors, the members are required to submit bids in excess 
of the current price. The amount of the excess is determined 
by a 'Jcale ranging from 20 per cent down to 5 per cent of the 
current price depending on the current job price per month. 
If, on the other hand, the current price is found to be un-
reasonable, or the service unsatisfactory, or there is a specific 
reason for changing contractors, members may submit any 
bids they see fit. Defendants entered this agreement "with 
the intent and for the object and purpose of conducting 
operations at a reasonable profit, of marketing at a reasonable 
profit products and services which could not otherwise be so 
) 
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marketed and of acting in furtherance of trade, and with no 
other intent whatever nor for any other object or purpose 
whatever. There is no evidence, except as stated in this 
stipulation, if any is stated herein, that the effect of the 
admitted agreement bas exceeded, exceeds or will exceed the 
stated intentions, objects or purposes." 
[1] It is clear that defendants' agreement constitutes a 
trust as defined in section 16720 of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code.· Not only have defendants agreed to fix the 
prices at which maintenance service will be provided (§ 16720 
(d), (e», but they have also undertaken to prevent com· 
petition among themselves by forcing their customers to pay 
higher prices if they seek to change maintenance contractors. 
(§ 16720 (c).) Defendants contend, however, that their 
agreement is exelilpted from the prohibitions of the Cart-
wright Act by virtue of sections 16723 and 16725 of the 
Business and Professions Code. 
Section 16723 provides that •• No agreement, combination or 
association is unlawful or within the provisions of this 
chapter, the object and purpose of which are to conduct 
operations at a reasonable profit or to market at a reasonable 
profit those products which can not otherwise be so marketed." 
.,' A trust is a combiIlatiOll of capital, akill or aeta by two or more 
persons for any of the folIowiIlg purposes: 
.. <a) To create or carry out restrictions ill trade or commerce. 
It (b) To limit or reduce the production, or iIlarease the price of mer-
chandise or of any commodity . 
•• (c) To prevent competition iII manufaeturiIlg, making, transporta-
tion, aale or purchase of merchandlse, produce or any commodity • 
.. (d) To fix at any standard or figure, whereby ita price to the public 
or consumer ahall be iII any manner controlled or established, any 
article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce iIltended for 
aale, barter, use or consumption iII this State. 
I< (e) To make or enter iIlto or execute or carry out any contract, 
obligations or agreements of any kind or description, by which they do 
all or any or any combiIlation of any of the folIowiDg: 
I< (1) BiIld themselves not to sell, dispose of 01' transport any article 
or any commodity or any article of trade, use, merchandise, commerce 
or consumption below a common standard figure, or bed value_ 
I< (2) Agree iII any manner to keep the price of such artiele, com-
modity or transportation at a fixed or graduated figure • 
.. (3) Establish or settle the price of any article, commodity or trans-
portation between them or themselves and others, so as directly or iII· 
directly to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among them-
selves, or any purchasers or consumers iII the sale or transportation of 
any such article or commodity . 
.. (4) Agree to pool, combiIle or directly or iIldireetly unite any 
iIlterests that they may have connected with the sale or transportation 
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In Cline v. Frink Dairy 00., 274 U.S. 445 [47 S.Ct. 681, 71 
L.Ed. 1146J, it was held that the same exemption contained 
in the Colorado Anti-Trust Act left the whole statute "with-
(lut a fixed standard of guilt" and thus rendered it unconstitu-
tional. In Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 
2d 34 [172 P.2d 867], we ,held that because the exemption 
was added to the statute by amendment it was separable from 
the rest of the act. Defendants contend, however, that later 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate that 
it would no longer follow the Cline ease, and that in any 
event the state has no standing to challenge the validity of 
the amendment upon which defendants rely. 
Examination of recent cases upholding statutes attacked 
on the ground of vagueness does not persuade us that the 
Cline case was wrongly decided or that the Supreme Court 
would not follow it today. In Bandini 00. v.Superior Oourt, 
284 U.S. 8 [52 s.Ot. 103,76 L.Ed. 136J, the words "unreason-
able waste of natural gas" were found to have an ascertain-
able meaning in the industry involved. (See, also, Kay v. 
U"1Iited States, 303 U.S. 1, 9 [58 S.Ct. 468, 82 L.Ed. 607].) 
In OhapZinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 [62 S.Ct. 
766.86 L.Ed. 1031]. the vague terms of the statute had been 
given a sufficiently definite and restrictive interpretation by 
the state court. (Of. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507. 
518-519 [68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed. 840] ; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 
306 U.S. 451. 457 {59 S.Ct. 618. 83 L.Ed. 888].) In other 
cases. althougb the prohibited acts were ~efined in vague 
terms. the statutes were upheld because they required the 
presence of an adequately defined specifie intent. (Williams 
v. United States, 341 U.S. 97. 101-102 [71 S.Ct. 576. 95 L.Ed. 
774] ; Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 515-516 [71 S.Ot. 
857, 95 L.Ed. 1137J ; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 
[67 S.Ot. 1538. 91 L.Ed. 1877] ; Gorin v. United States, 812 
U.S. 19, 27-28 [61 S.Ot. 429, 85 L.Ed. 488] ; Screws v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 91. 101 [65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495]; 
F. ct A. lee Oream 00. v. Arden Far"Jfl$ 00., 98 F.Supp. 180, 
187, and cases cited.) Thus a person who undertakes to evade 
income taxes by padding his expenses has fair warning that 
he may violate the law even though he may not be sure where 
a jury may draw the line between reasonable and unreason-
able expenses. (United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 [62 
S.Ct. 374, 86 L.Ed. 383].) As Mr. Justice Holmes said in 
sustaining the validity of a statute dealing with contribu-
tions for "political purposes," "Whenever the law draws a 
.' ' 
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line there will be cases very near each other on opposite sides. 
The precise course of the line may be uncertain, but no one can 
come near it without knowing that he does so, if he thinks, 
and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to make 
him take the risk." (United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 
396, 399 [50 S.Ot. 167, 74 L.Ed. 508].) 
[2] In the present case, however, the vagueness of the 
words "reasonable profit" infects the whole statutory stand-
ard of conduct. An agreement is legal or illegal depending on 
whether its purpose is to secure reasonable or unreasonable 
profits. Defendants can know when they have approached 
the line separating legal from illegal conduct only if they 
can in some way determine what reasonable profits are. There 
is no common law background to guide them (cf. Nash v. 
United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 t33 S.Ct. 780, 57 L.Ed. 
1232] ), and there is no fund of common knowledge or ex-
perience that would allow either them or the court to de-
termine what those words mean. Reasonable profits might 
be defined as those that would permit the payment of rea-
sonable wages and provide a reasonable return on the capital 
invested. Such a definition, however, would raise serious 
difficulties in determining what are reasonable wages and a 
reasonable return on capital. (See, Connelly v. General Const. 
Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393-394 146 S.Ot. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322]; 
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 [41 
S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed 516].) Moreover, an industry may be 
inefficient or producing a product about to be driven from 
the market by a superior substitute. In such cases to ob-
tain profits sufficient to permit payment of reasonable wages 
and provide a reasonable return on capital would require 
suppression of efficient competitors or elimination of the com-
petitive substitute. We do not believe that the Legislature 
intended that reasonable profits should carry a meaning that 
would permit such a result. On the other hand, we cannot 
conclude that reasonable profits should be defined as the 
actual profits realized in a free market. The amendment pre-
supposes that the free market is to be interfered with by an 
agreement to secure reasonable profits. It would be super-
fluous if it permitted only those agreements that have no ef-
fect on a free market. It may be assumed that in amending 
the Cartwright Act the Legislature contemplated that eco-
nomic considerations may justify restraints of trade in cer-
tain circumstances. (See Poultry Producers of 80. Calif. v. 
Barww, 189 Cal. 278, 284-285 [208 P. 93] ; D. Ghirardelli Co. 
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v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355, 362-363 [128 P. 1041].) It fell 
short, however, of expressing its purpose in terms sufficiently 
clear to be given effect. 
Defendants' contention that the state has no standing to 
attack the validity of the amendment cannot be sustained. 
[3] It has generally been held that an invalid amendment 
to a valid statute is ineffective for any purpose. (Frost v. 
Corporation Commission, 278 U.S. 515, 526 [49 S.Ct. 235, 
73 L.Ed. 483] ; Waters· Pierce Oil Co. v.Texas, 177 U.S. 28, 
47 [20 S.Ot. 518, 44 L.Ed. 657]; Miller v. Union Bank & 
Trust Co., 7 Cal.2d 31, 36 [59 P.2d 1024]; Commonwealth 
v. Malco-Memphis Theatres, Inc., 293 Ky. 531 [169 S.W.2d 
596, 598]; see, also, Bacon Service Corp. v. Huss, 199 Cal. 
21, 35 [248 P. 235]; anno., 66 A.L.R. 1483.) [4] If the 
state could not attack the amendment on the ground that it 
is unconstitutionally "lague, it would remain a part of the 
statutory standard of conduct, and the resulting uncertainty 
would necessitate invalidating the entire statute. (Cline v. 
Frink Dairy Co., supra, 274 U.S. 445, 457.) Accordingly. 
it follows from the holding that the amendment is separable 
from the rest of the act (Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwrit-
ers, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 34, 47-48), that it must be treated as 
invalid for all purposes. The problem is well illustrated by 
cases involving amendments that have been held invalid be-
cause they would deny equal protection by exempting cer-
tain classes from the operation of preexisting statutes. These 
cases hold that since the amendments purporting to create the 
invalid exemptions are void, members of the nonexempted 
classes are not denied equal protection. (Waters-Pierce Oil 
Co. v. Texas, supra, 177 U.S. 28, 47: Ex parte Davis, 21 F. 
396, 397-398; Buffalo Gravel Corp. v. Moore, 201 App.Div. 
242 [194 N.Y.S. 225, 232], affirmed 234 N.Y. 542 [138 N.E. 
439]; Gay v. Brent, 166 Ky. 833 [179 S.W. 1051, 1058]; 
People v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron 00.,201 Ill. 236 [66 N.E. 
349, 356] ; Bacon Service Oorp. v. Huss, supra, 199 Cal. 21, 
35.) If, however, the state could not rely on the invalidity 
of the amendments in subsequent litigation against members 
of the exempted classes,. those classes would escape the opera-
tion of the statutes and equal protection would be denied to 
those not exempted. 
[6] Defendants contend that their agreement is lawful 
under the provision of section 16725 of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code providing that "It is not unlawful to enter 
into agreements or form associations or combinationa • • • 
) 
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which are in furtherance of trade." This provisions is the 
converse of subdivision a of section 16720, which defines an 
invalid trust as one created "to carry out restrictions in trade 
or commerce. " Since the Cartwright Act articulates in greater 
detail a public policy that has long been recognized at common 
law (Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 
34, 44), these provisions must be considered in the light of 
common-law precedents. Moreover, it may be assumed that 
the broad prohibitions of the Cartwright Act are subject to 
an implied exception similar to the one that validates reason-
able restraints of trade under the federal Sherman Antitrust 
Act. (See Standard Oil 00. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 60 
[31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed.619].) Under the Sherman act, how-
ever, agreements fixing prices are "illegal per se." (Schweg-
mann Bros. v. Oalvert Distillers Oorp., 341 U.S. 384, 386 [71 
S.Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035, 19 A.L.R.2d 1119], and cases cited.) 
Similarly it has generally been held that such agreements are 
invalid in this state both at common law and under the pro-
visions of the Cartwright Act. (Speegle v. Board of Fire 
Underwriters, supra, 29 Cal.2d 34, 44; Endicott v. Rosenthal, 
216 Cal. 721, 726 [16 P.2d 673] ; People v. H. Jevne 00., 179 
Cal. 621, 625 [178 P. 517]..) An exception was recognized 
permitting a manufacturer to enter valid contracts with re-
tailers fixing the price at which his product might be sold 
(D. Ghirardelli 00. v. Hunsicker, supra, 164 Cal. 355, 362; 
Grogan v. Ohaffee, 156 Cal. 611, 614 [105 P. 745, 27 L.R.A.N.S. 
395; see Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16.900-16905), and in Herri-
man v. Menzies,115 Cal. 16 [44 P. 660, 46 P. 730, 56 Am. 
St.Rep. 82, 35 L.R.A. 318], it was held that an agreement be-
tween stevedoring firms with respect to prices was not invalid 
when it appeared that the firms in question constituted only 
an insignificant part of those engaged in the business and had 
no power to control prices generally. 
Defendants contend that the Herriman case is controlling 
here because they service less than ont'-half of one per cent 
of the buildings serviced in San Francisco. The Herriman 
case was decided before the Cartwright Act was adopted in 
1907, and in view of the specific provisions of the act with 
respect to price fixing that case is no longer controlling. 
(People v. H. Jevne 00., supra, 179 Cal. 621, 625; see United 
States v.Trenton Potteries 00., 273 U.S. 392, 397 [47 S.Ct. 
377, 71 L.Ed. 700].) In any event, defendants do not consti-
tute an insignificant part of the building maintenance industry 
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in San Francisco. That industry consists of those persons and 
firms who contract to supply building maintenance service 
to owners, lessees, and managers, and defendants' operations 
. constitute approximately 90 per cent of those of the industry 
as a whole. It is immaterial that the great majority of owners, 
lessees, and managers maintain their buildings without the 
. assistance of maintenance contractors. In addition to material 
and labor, such contractors supply valuable managerial serv-
ices, and defendants' agreement materially reduces competi-
tion in the supplying of such services and affects the prices 
at which they are available. 
[6] Defendants contend that their agreement is valid be-
cause it operates only to prevent tortious interference with 
existing contract rights. They point out that a member of the 
association is required to submit a higher bid only if the person 
soliciting the bid has an existing unexpired contract with 
another member, and contend that the purpose of requiring 
the higher bid is to avoid inducing a breach of the existing 
contract. It is unnecessary to decide whether such a purpose 
or effect would validate an agreement otherwise prohibited 
by the Cartwright Act. Defendants' agreement goes much 
further. Ordinarily a person soliciting bids for maintenance 
service would do so in advance of the expiration date of his 
current contract, not for the purpose of breaching his con-
tract, but to avoid interruption of service in the event that 
he should not wish to renew it. Thus in the usual situation 
defendants' agreement does not operate to prevent interference 
with existing contract rights, but rather to fix prices and 
restrict competition in the future. 
[7a] Defendants finally contend that the judgment is 
erroneous because it enjoins them from "Formulating, pro-
moting, participating or combining in any understanding, 
compact, scheme, pJan or agreement to raise, fix, adhere to or 
maintain prices for the furnishing of labor, material and 
services in the building maintenance industry," without dis-
tinguishing between agreements among themselves in restraint 
of trade and legaJ contracts with their customers establishing 
prices for particular jobs. [8] In the commonly accepted -
sense of the term, however, a price fixing agreement is not 
one whereby one pal'ty merely agrees to supply goods or serv-
ices to another at a given price, but one whereby the parties 
seek to determine the price at which goods or services shall 
be offered to third parties. (See Schwegmarm Bros. v. Calvert 
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1035, 19 A.L.R. 1119] ; Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 
725-727 [16 P.2d 673] ; Max Factor ~ Co. v. Kunsman,S Cal. 
2d 446, 464 [55 P.2d 177] ; Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 16720, d, 
e (1,), (2), (3); 16902.) [7b] Thus the injunction cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as prohibiting defendants from con-
tracting with their customers to provide services at such prices 
as the customers may agree to pay. It only enjoins defendants 
from agreeing among themselves to engage in the prohibited 
activities. 
Since the stipulated facts support the judgment as entered 
and there is no evidence that would support a contrary con-
clusion, the order granting a new trial is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
) 
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